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Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini have recently argued that the theory 
of natural selection (NS) fails to explain how evolution occurs (Fodor & Piattelli-
Palmarini 2010; F&PP). Their argument is not with the fact of evolution but with 
the common claim that NS provides a causal mechanism for this fact. Their claim 
has been greeted with considerable skepticism, if not outright hostility.1 Despite 
the rhetorical heat of much of the discussion, I do not believe that critics have 
generally engaged the argument that F&PP have actually presented. It is clear 
that the validity of F&PP’s argument is of interest to biolinguists. Indeed, there 
has been much discussion of late concerning the evolution of the faculty of 
language and what this implies for the structure of Universal Grammar. 
 To facilitate evaluation of F&PP’s proposal, the following attempts to 
sketch a reconstruction of their argument that, to my knowledge, has not been 
considered. 
  
1. ‘Select’ is not ‘select for’, the latter being intensional.2   
2. The ‘free-rider problem’ shows that NS per se does not have the theoretical 
resources to distinguish between ‘select’ and ‘select for’. 
3. If not, then how can NS causally explain evolutionary change? 
4. There are two ways of circumventing the free-rider problem.3 
a. Attribute mental powers to NS, i.e. NS as Mother Nature, thereby en-
dowing NS with inherent intensionality and so the wherewithal to 
distinguish ‘select’ from ‘select for’. 
b. Find within NS a law supporting counterfactuals, i.e. laws of natural 
selection/evolution, which also would suffice to provide the requisite 
intensionality. 
                                                 
   Thanks to Jerry Fodor, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, and Paul Pietroski for comments and 
discussion. 
    1 See, for example Block & Kitcher (2010), Futuyma (2010), and Pigliucci (2010). 
    2 Intensional contexts are ones in which extensionally identical expressions are not freely 
interchangeable. Thus, if John intends to kiss Mary and Mary is the Queen of the Night, we 
cannot conclude that John intends to kiss the Queen of the Night.  
    3 F&PP develop this argument in chapter 6. The classic locus of the problem is Gould & 
Lewontin (1979). 
Biolinguistics    Forum   
 
383 
5. The first option is clearly nuts, so NS accounts must be presupposing (4b). 
6. But NS contains no laws of evolution — a fact that seems to be widely 
recognized! 
7. So, NS can’t do what it purports to do: give a causal theory that explains the 
facts of evolution. 
8. Importantly, NS fails not because causal accounts cannot be given for 
individual cases of evolution. They can be and routinely are. Rather, the 
accounts are individual causal scenarios, natural histories specific to the 
case at hand, and there is nothing in common across the mechanisms in-
voked by these individual accounts besides the fact that they end with 
winners and losers. This is, in fact, often acknowledged. The only relevant 
question then is whether NS might contain laws of NS/evolution? F&PP 
argue that NS does not contain within itself such laws and that, given the 
main lines of the theory, it is very unlikely that any could be developed. 
9. Interestingly, this gap(/flaw) in NS is now often remarked in the biology 
literature. F&PP sample some work of this sort in the book. The research 
they review tends to have a common form in that it explores a variety of 
structural constraints that, were they operative, would circumscribe the 
possible choices NS faces. However, importantly, the mechanisms pro-
posed are adventitious to NS; they can be added to it but do not follow 
from it. 
10. If these kinds of proposals succeed, then they could be combined with NS 
to provide a causal theory of evolution. However, this would require giv-
ing up the claim that NS explains evolution. Rather, at most, NS + structural 
theories together explain evolutionary change.4 
11. But, were such accounts to develop, the explanatory weight of the com-
bined ‘NS + structural theory’ account would be carried by the added 
structural constraints — not NS. In other words, all that is missing from NS 
is that part that can give it causal heft and, though this could be added to 
NS, NS itself does not contain the resources to develop such a theory on its 
own. Critics might then conclude as follows: This means that NS can give 
causal accounts when supplemented in the ways indicated. However, this 
is quite tendentious. It is like saying Newton’s theory suffices to account 
for electro-magnetic effects for, after all, Newton’s laws can be added to 
Maxwell’s to give an account of electro-magnetic phenomena!  
12. F&PP make one additional point of interest to linguists. Their review and 
conclusions concerning NS are not really surprising, for NS replays the 
history of empiricist psychology — though strictly speaking, the latter was 
                                                 
    4 Observe that the supposition that selection is simply a function of ‘external’ environmental 
factors lies behind the standard claim that NS (and NS alone) explains why evolutionary 
changes are generally adaptive. Adding structural ‘internal’ constraints to the selective mix 
weakens the force of this explanation. To the degree that the internal structural factors 
constrain the domain of selection — to that degree, the classical explanation for the adaptive 
fit between organism and environment fails. 
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less nutty than NS, for empiricists had a way of distinguishing intensional 
from non-intensional as minds are just the sorts of things that are in-
herently intensional. In other words, though attributing mental intensional 
powers to NS (i.e. Mother Nature) is silly, attributing such powers to 
humans is not. 
 
 This is the argument. To be honest, it strikes me as pretty powerful if 
correct, and it does indeed look very similar to early debates between rationalist 
and empiricist approaches to cognition. However, my present intention has not 
been to defend the argument, but to lay it out given that much of the criticism 
against F&PP’s book seems to have misconstrued what they were saying. 
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